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Jaw-ling Joanne Chang*
I. INTRODUCTION
Almost a quarter of a century ago, in a March 8, 1963 People's Daily(Renmin Ribao) editorial the People's Republic of China ("PRC") an-
nounced its policy to settle "peacefully through negotiations" the ques-
tions of Hong Kong and Macao "when conditions are ripe."'
On September 26, 1984, the PRC and the United Kingdom initialed
in Beijing the so-called Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong
Kong.' This agreement was reached after two years of negotiations. It
was signed by Britain's Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and Premier
Zhao Ziyang on December 19, 1984 and ratifications were exchanged on
May 27, 1985. According to the Joint Declaration, the United King-
dom's sovereignty and jurisdiction over Hong Kong will cease in 1997.1
Hong Kong will thereupon become a Special Administrative Region of
the PRC under article 31 of the PRC Constitution on July 1, 1997. 4 It
will enjoy a "high degree of autonomy," except in defense and foreign
affairs. The current social and economic systems in Hong Kong will re-
main unchanged for fifty years after 1997.1
On March 26, 1987, the PRC reached a similar agreement with Por-
tugal on the question of Macao.6 The so-called Joint Declaration on the
* Associate Professor of Political Science, National Taiwan University; Research Associate,
Institute of American Culture, Academia Sinica. Presently Visiting Scholar, East Asian Legal Pro-
gram, University of Maryland School of Law. Ph.D., University of Maryland; M.A., University of
Delaware.
1 J. COHEN & H. CHIU, 1 PEOPLE'S CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 380 (1974).
2 Joint Declaration on Hong Kong Initialed, BEIJING REV., Oct. 1, 1984, at 6.
3 Joint Declaration of the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government
of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland On the Question of Hong Kong, Dec.
19, 1984, United Kingdom-People's Republic of China 1984 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 20 (Cmd. 9352) para.
1 [hereinafter Hong Kong Joint Declaration], reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1371 (1984) (within the British
white Paper referred to as the Draft Agreement).
4 Id.
5 Id. para. 3(12).
6 China to Resume Sovereignty Over Macao, BEIJING REv., Apr. 6, 1987, at 7. For an analysis
of the negotiation of the Joint Declaration, see Deng, Comments and Analysis on the Sino-Portuguese
'Macao Question'Agreement, IsSUES AND STUD., June 10, 1987, at 31-40; Kuo, Comments on the
Sino-Portuguese Negotiations on the Macao Question, STUD. IN COMMUNISM, July 15, 1987, at 49-55;
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Question of Macao was signed by Portugal's Prime Minister Anibal
Cavaco Silva and Zhao Ziyang in Beijing on April 13, 1987. Ratifica-
tions of this Joint Declaration were exchanged on January 15, 1988 in
Beijing.7 The PRC will resume its sovereignty over Macao on December
20, 1999.8 Macao will also become a Special Administrative Region of
the PRC, similar to Hong Kong, with a high degree of autonomy, except
in defense and foreign affairs. The current social and economic systems
in Macao will remain unchanged, as will the freedoms associated with its
life style, for fifty years after 1999.9
The similarities of the Hong Kong and Macao settlements are ap-
parent, and, accordingly one is strongly tempted to couple them together
as woven from the same cloth. While the Hong Kong negotiations and
settlement have been accorded substantial scholarly attention,10 this has
not been the case with Macao.
This article closely analyzes the Macao settlement from the perspec-
tive of Beijing's negotiating tactics, with peripheral glances at the Hong
Kong settlement for comparative purposes. The article discerns, there-
fore, the distinctive features of the Macao settlement.
Because of the complexity and secrecy involved with the Macao and
Hong Kong negotiations, this article emphasizes only the most signifi-
cant and controversial issues bargained by the PRC with the United
Kingdom and Portugal, respectively.
On the Hong Kong question, the most difficult issue between the
PRC and United Kingdom was whether Britain could continue her sov-
ereignty and administration of Hong Kong after 1997. In contrast, Lis-
bon agreed in 1974 that the PRC had sovereignty over Macao." The
major disputes, however, were: when should Portugal return Macao to
the PRC, and how to resolve the problems associated with the question
of nationality.
The United Kingdom in 1984 made concessions on both sovereignty
and administration issues.12 In 1987, Portugal gained more concessions
Yu, An Analysis on the Chicom-Portuguese 'Agreement' on Macao, STUD. ON CHINESE COMMUNISM
MONTHLY, Apr. 15, 1987, at 71-78.
7 People's Daily, Jan. 16, 1988, at 1.
8 Joint Declaration of the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government
of the Republic of Portugal on the Question of Macao [hereinafter Macao Joint Declaration], Annex
I, § I, reprinted in BEIJING REV., Apr. 6, 1987 (special insert).
9 Id. paras. 2-3, Annex I.
10 For a selected bibliography, see THE FUTURE OF HONG KONG 243-54 (H. Chiu, Y.C. Jao &
Y.L. Wu eds. 1987).
11 Macau, ASIA 1987 YEARBOOK 181 (1987) [hereinafter Macau '87].
12 Background to the Negotiations Preceding the Sino-British Joint Declaration, in THE FUTURE
OF HONG KONG, supra note 10, at 197-222 (detailing the Sino-British Negotiations on Hong Kong).
See generally F. CHING, HONG KONG AND CHINA FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE (1985) (discussing
the Sino-British negotiations on the sovereignty and administration issues).
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from the PRC, however, than the United Kingdom had negotiated. 13
The PRC originally wanted to take over Macao and Hong Kong at the
same time in 1997."4 Portugal, on the other hand, did not want to return
Macao in 1997.15 A compromise was reached between Beijing and Lis-
bon. Macao will be returned to the PRC in 1999.16 On the question of
nationality, the PRC apparently acquiesced to the Portuguese demand of
dual nationality.
What are the distinctive features of the Macao settlement? Why did
the PRC make more concessions to the Portuguese than to the British?
These questions, together with Beijing's negotiating tactics, are the main
focus of this study.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
As early as 1516, Portuguese traders were using Macao as a stop-
over on the voyage to Japan. 7 The right to anchor and trade in the
oldest European settlement in East Asia was gained through bribery of
local officials by the Portuguese in 1535.18 Portuguese settlement of Ma-
cao was agreed to by the Chinese in 1557,19 but actual Portuguese Ad-
13 Portugal also gained more protection for the Portuguese descendants in the Sino-Portuguese
agreement: "The Macao Special Administrative Region shall protect, according to law, the interests
of residents of Portuguese descent in Macao and shall respect their customs and cultural traditions."
Macao Joint Declaration, supra note 8, Annex I, § V. There is an absence of such a provision in the
Sino-British Agreement on the Hong Kong question. In addition, the Sino-Portuguese agreement
does not mention the stationing of Chinese military forces. The Sino-British agreement, on the
hand, states "Military forces sent by the Central People's Government to be stationed in the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region for the purpose of defence shall not interfere in the internal
affairs of the ... Region." Hong Kong Joint Declaration, supra note 3, Annex I, § XIII. For
further comparisons, see Leung & Yeung, How Macau's Pact Differs from Ours, S. China Morning
Post, Mar. 27, 1987, at 7; Macao Agreement to be Commended, S. China Morning Post, Mar. 24,
1987, at 14, reprinted in FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE, Mar. 24, 1987, at W3 [here-
inafter F.B.I.S.]; Lin, There are Gains and Losses in Sino-Portuguese and Sino-British Agreements,
PAI SHING, Apr. 16, 1987, at 47-48.
14 Yu, Macao's Past, Present, and Future, in SELECTED INFORMATION ON MACAO 1535-1985
12 (1985) (On October 3, 1984, Deng Xiaoping told a delegation from Hong Kong and Macao that
"the Macao question, like Hong Kong, will be settled at the same time and with the same formula."
Deng's remark drew strong reactions from Macao. Three days later, Deng told Ma Man Kee, chair-
man of Macao's General Chamber of Commerce and a local deputy of the National People's Con-
gress of the PRC, that "there is no rush for the Macao issue. It may be seven or eight years or even
longer before we talk about it. Please have confidence, continue working." On March 30, 1985,
Peng Zhen said: "The Macao question [is] like Hong Kong... people in Hong Kong and Macao
should both be prepared to return to the motherland on July 1, 1997.").
15 For a further discussion, see infra part III.
16 Macao Joint Declaration, supra note 8, para. 3.
17 BUREAU OF PUB. AFF., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BACKGROUND NOTES, MACAU 3 (Oct.
1982).
18 Huan, Macao Faces Historical Change, BEIJING REV., May 26, 1986, at 21.
19 BUREAU OF PUB. AFF., supra note 17, at 3.
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ministration over Macao was not recognized until 1849.20 China refused
until 1887 to recognize Portugal's right of "perpetual occupation. ' 2 1
This occurred only when Portugal agreed "never to alienate Macao and
its dependencies without agreement with China."'22 This Manchu-Portu-
guese agreement was known as the Protocol of Lisbon.23
With the rise in power of the Chinese Communists in 1949, came
the retraction of the Protocol of Lisbon. The Chinese stated that the
agreement was an "unequal treaty" imposed by foreigners on China and
was, therefore, invalid.24 In 1951, Macao was termed by the Portuguese
to be an Overseas Province.25 Meanwhile, however, the PRC made no
attempt to regain Macao. Beijing's position was that "when conditions
are ripe," the Macao issue "should be settled peacefully through negotia-
tions and that, pending a settlement, the status quo should be
maintained. 26
Portugal, on the other hand, made two unsuccessful attempts to re-
turn Macao to China in 1967 and 1974. In November and December
1966 during the Cultural Revolution, a confrontation between local, mili-
tant leftist Chinese elements and the Macao police provoked civil distur-
bances. From December 1-4, massive demonstrations launched by
militant leftists against the Macao government turned into riots. At least
eight people were killed, 212 injured, and 61 arrested.27 Macao's Portu-
guese Governor, Brigadier Nobre de Carvalho, was reported to have of-
fered to abandon Macao within one month.28 The PRC was not ready to
accept this offer, apparently because it feared acceptance would adversely
affect the prosperity of Hong Kong. Moreover, the PRC generated about
half of its foreign exchange earnings through its annual trade with Hong
Kong and Macao. 29 Any sign of instability, such as a change in sover-
20 Id. See also ALMANAC OF MACAU'S ECONOMY 4 (H. Wong ed. 1986).
21 Macao was ceded in perpetuity to Portugal under art. 2 of the Sino-Portuguese Treaty of
Dec. 1, 1887. For the text of the treaty, see 2 TREATIES, CONVENTIONS, ETC., BETWEEN CHINA
AND FOREIGN STATES 274-75 (2d ed. 1973).
22 Macau, ASIA 1982 YEARBOOK 191 (1982) [hereinafter Macau '82].
23 BUREAU OF PUB. AFF., supra note 17, at 3.
24 Id.
25 Macau '82, supra note 22, at 191.
26 1 PEOPLE'S CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: A DOCUMENTARY STUDY, supra note 1,
at 380.
27 Macao, ASIA 1968 YEARBOOK 230 (1968) [hereinafter Macao '68].
28 Id.
29 Macao, ASIA 1975 YEARBOOK 211 (1975) [hereinafter Macao '75]. See also China, ASIA
1968 YEARBOOK 156 (1968); China, ASIA 1969 YEARBOOK 148-49 (1969) (In 1966, China had a
favorable trade balance of $472.04 million. In 1967, because of local riots, Hong Kong's imports
from China were substantially down. China's favorable trade balance dropped to $388.88 million in
1967.). For details of the riots that exploded in Hong Kong in 1967, see Hong Kong, ASIA 1968
YEARBOOK 165-66 (1968). For trade figures between Hong Kong and the PRC 1950-1985, see
YEARBOOK ON CHINESE COMMUNISM 11-45 (1987).
Vol. 20:253
SETTLEMENT OF THE MACAO ISSUE
eigns, would have been immediately felt in Hong Kong. The Chinese
feared a flight of capital from the British colony, as later happened dur-
ing 1967 riots, so the PRC wished to maintain the status quo.3°
The confrontation was resolved in January 1967. A protocol was
signed between the Portuguese officials in Macao and leftist organiza-
tions.3a Indeed, the Portuguese accepted responsibility for the riots, and
agreed to pay about H.K.$2.5 million "compensation. '32 In addition,
the Portuguese agreed to eliminate the Kuomintang influence, and to
close its border to refugees from the adjacent mainland.33 As a result of
the riots, therefore, Beijing gained a real ability to influence Macao's
affairs. 34
After Portugal's April 25, 1974 revolution, its new socialist govern-
ment quickly introduced a new constitution which, among other things,
abolished Portugal's long-time colonial policy.35 The new government
tried, unsuccessfully, to negotiate returning Macao to China. The 1976
Portuguese constitution states that Macao is not Portuguese territory but
is under Portuguese administration.36 The departure on December 31,
1975 of the 400 year-old symbol of Portuguese military presence, the lo-
cal garrison, reflected the change in the attitude of the government.3 7
Lisbon unilaterally recognized the PRC on January 6, 1975.38 The
Lisbon government, on February 1, 1979, acknowledged that the Macao
issue was interfering with establishment of diplomatic relations.39 How-
ever, Lisbon and Beijing finally normalized relations on February 8,
1979.' It was revealed in 1985 that an understanding between Lisbon
and Beijing had been reached: Beijing considered Macao's status as an
issue to be settled when conditions are ripe, while Portugal considered
Macao to be a Chinese territory under Portuguese administration.4'
During the 1982-84 Sino-British negotiations on the Hong Kong
30 Macau '75, supra note 29, at 211.
31 BUREAU OF PUB. AFF., supra note 17, at 3.
32 Macao '68, supra note 27, at 230.
33 Id.
34 Macao '75, supra note 29, at 211. See also R. ROBINSON, CONTEMPORARY PORTUGAL 105-
06 (1979); Cremer, A Model for Macau?, ASIAN ArF., Winter 1986-87, at 54.
35 R. ROBINSON, supra note 34, at 224, 257 (stating "It]he new constitution of the Portuguese
Republic was approved by the Constituent Assembly on April 2, 1976.").
36 Cremer, supra note 34, at 45.
37 Macau, ASIA 1977 YEARBOOK 219 (1977).
38 Macau, ASIA 1978 YEARBOOK 236 (1978).
39 Id. at 225.
40 Id. at 224. See Sino-Portuguese Positions on the Macao Question, in SELECTED INFORMA-
TION ON MACAO 1535-1985, supra note 14, at 28.
41 BUREAU OF PUB. AFF., supra note 17, at 3. See also Portuguese President's Press Interview in
Macau, May 17, 1985, [hereinafter Portuguese President's Press Interview] in PROBLEMS OF MACAU:
COLLECTION OF INFORMATION ON MACAU (2) at 8 (1986).
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question, Macao's future also became a subject of speculation. Liao
Chengzhi, then Director of the Hong Kong/Macao Office in Beijing, an-
nounced in January 1983 that the Macao issue would be dealt with after
an agreement with the British was reached over Hong Kong. 2 On June
16, 1981, however, Macao's Governor, Vasco de Almeida e Costa,43 had
insisted that there was a major difference between the Hong Kong and
Macao issues. Costa stated that Macao is not a colony, and there is no
deadline which would mark the end of Portuguese administration.'
After the settlement of the Hong Kong issue in 1984, the PRC
showed renewed interest in repossessing Macao. During the first visit by
Portuguese President Ramalho Eanes in May 1985, the PRC raised the
Macao issue.45 The significance of the visit was heightened by the release
of a joint communique stating that the Macao issue would be negotiated
in the near future through diplomatic channels.46 This announcement
put an end to any lingering hopes that the people of Macao might be
ignored by the Chinese while Hong Kong prepared to return to the
PRC's sovereignty.
In March 1986, PRC Vice Foreign Minister Zhou Nan, the head of
the Chinese delegation which negotiated the Hong Kong issue, visited
Portugal to attend the inauguration of the newly elected Portuguese
President, Mario Soares. Zhou Nan brought up the Macao issue during
his Lisbon trip, and both sides agreed to start negotiations in May
1986.47
III. THE MACAO NEGOTIATIONS
A. Summary of the Macao Negotiations
The first round of talks was held in Beijing on June 30 and July 1,
1986, and the PRC and Portugal reached an agreement on the general
agenda for future talks.4" They also exchanged views on some substan-
tive matters, but informed sources believe the most important exchange
resulted in an agreement that the transfer date for Macao would com-
prise a major issue.49
42 Macau, ASIA 1984 YEARBOOK 207 (1984) [hereinafter Macau '84].
43 Vasco de Almeida e Costa served as Governor of Macao from 1981-86.
44 Macau '84, supra note 42, at 207.
45 Portuguese President's Press Interview, supra note 41, at 7.
46 Huan, supra note 18, at 21.
47 Ho, What about Macau?, THE NINETIES, Apr. 1986, at 63.
48 See PRC-Portugal to Hold Macao Talks 9-10 September, Hong Kong Standard, Aug. 21,
1986, at 3, reprinted in F.B.I.S., Aug. 21, 1986, at W1. Zhou Nan was the head of the PRC delega-
tion, while Rui Barbosa Medina, Ambassador to the United Nations, headed the Portuguese delega-
tion. For a complete list of Chinese and Portuguese negotiation delegations, see Portuguese
President's Press Interview, supra note 40, at 4.
49 Delfs & Lau, New Talks, Old Talks, FAR E. ECON. REV., July 10, 1986, at 13.
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Both the second round (September 9-10, 1986) and third round (Oc-
tober 21-22, 1986) were also held in Beijing. After the third round, the
two sides announced in a joint press communique released on October
22, 1986 an intent to establish a working group for the settlement of the
Macao issue.50
A working group was formed in Beijing by the delegations of the
PRC and Portugal governments on December 8, 1986 to discuss and re-
vise in detail all the proposed draft agreements."1 Zhao Jihua, a member
of the Chinese negotiation team, was the leader of the PRC working
group, while the Portuguese group leader was Joao de Deus Ramos,
member of the Portuguese negotiation team.
Zhou Nan visited Lisbon on November 17-22, 1986 but no agree-
ment had been reached on the issue of the transfer date. 2 It was not
until January 1987 that Portugal finally agreed to return Macao to the
PRC prior to the year 2000."3 The last round of talks was held in Beijing
March 18-23, 1987 and agreement on the Macao issue was finally
reached.5 4
B. Negotiation on the Transfer Date
The PRC originally wanted to take over both Macao and Hong
Kong at the same time in 1997.15 Portugal, on the other hand, did not
want to return Macao in 1997. Inasmuch as Portugal had previously
tried twice, without success, to return Macao to the PRC, one may won-
der why Portugal now preferred to keep Macao beyond 2000. There
were several reasons. First, Portugal believed that, unlike the return of
Hong Kong, there was no deadline for the Portuguese government to
turn over Macao. Portugal maintained that Macao was not a colony,
rather it was a territory under Portuguese administration. 6 This consti-
tuted a great difference between the Hong Kong and Macao issues.
Second, Portugal did not want to return Macao to the PRC without
careful planning. In the mid-1970s, Portugal's decolonization efforts
were marked by bloodshed and humiliation, leaving behind over a half
5o PRC-Portugal Group Discusses Macao Issue, reprinted in F.B.I.S., Dec. 9, 1986, at W2.
51 Id.
52 PRC, Portugal Disagree on Date For Macao's Return (Hong Kong AFP, Dec. 30, 1986),
reprinted in F.B.I.S. Dec. 30, 1986, at Wl.
53 Administration to Revert to PRC Before 2000 (Hong Kong AFP, Jan. 7, 1987), reprinted in
F.B.I.S., Jan. 7, 1987, at Wi.
54 Press Communique (Xinhua News Agency, Mar. 23, 1987), reprinted in F.B.I.S., Mar. 23,
1987, at W2.
55 Yu, supra note 14, at 12.
56 Macao Governor Cited on Relationship with China, Hong Kong Standard, Dec. 29, 1982, at
16, reprinted in F.B.I.S:, Dec. 29, 1982, at W2; Beasant, BeUing Meeting Held To Discuss Macao
Turnover, S. China Morning Post, Jan. 19, 1987, at 3, reprinted in F.B.I.S., Jan. 23, 1987, at W1.
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million embittered and destitute colonial refugees." (Table 1) Portugal
did not want to see a repeat of history in the case of Macao. In Septem-
ber 1986, Macao's Secretary for Economics, Finance and Tourism, Car-
los Monjardino, publicly acknowledged that Portugal had not done
much in the past 400-odd years in Macao."8 But now, he said, Portugal
had plans for several development projects such as construction of an
airport, a deep-sea port and a second bridge linking the Macao mainland
with Taipa Island. 9
Table 1 - Portuguese Overseas Territories and Date of Loss
Area Date Lost
Territory (in square miles) to Portugal
Asia
State of India 1,537 December 1961
Macao 6 December 1999
Timor 5,736 December 1975
Africa
Guin6 13,948 September 1974
Cape Verde Islands 1,557 July 1975
Sao Tom6 e Principe 372 July 1975
Angola 481,351 November 1975
Mozambique 303,070 July 1975
Source: R. ROBINSON, CONTEMPORARY PORTUGAL 95 (1979).
Third, Portugal thought it would take a long time to localize the
civil service in Macao. Portuguese is Macao's official language, and all
its laws, decrees and documents are written in Portuguese. Very few Ma-
canese Chinese speak Portuguese. According to one report, there are
only seventy-six government employees who know both Portuguese and
Chinese-less than one percent of the total government employees.'
While the Macanese-those of mixed Portuguese and Chinese blood
(about 5-10,000)-are in a minority, they hold 90% of the local govern-
ment jobs.6 The Macanese have traditionally acted as middlemen be-
tween the majority Cantonese-speaking Chinese population and the
minority Portuguese rulers. Senior posts in the government, including
the judiciary and the police, are also held by non-Chinese.62 The pros-
pect of localizing the civil service, in keeping with the PRC's slogan
57 R. ROBINSON, supra note 34, at 223.
58 Macau '87, supra note 11, at 182.
59 Id.
60 Hsiung, What Kind of Problems Will Macao Face During the Transitional Period?, MING
PAO MONTHLY, Apr. 1987, at 29. See also ALMANAC OF MACAO'S ECONOMY, supra note 20, at 40-
41.
61 Misquitta, Macao, in ASIA AND PACIFIC REVIEW 1986, at 149 (1986).
62 Id.; Hsiung, supra note 60, at 28.
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"Macao run by Macao people," will thus be very difficult. Hence, Portu-
gal thought it would be better to return Macao to the PRC after 2000 in
order to gain more time to develop a local administration.
Besides the aforementioned reasons, there was another practical and
very important economic consideration. Portugal believed that it would
benefit financially if Macao were not returned to the PRC right after the
PRC takeover of Hong Kong. Apprehensive Hong Kong businessmen
might transfer capital and investments from Hong Kong to Macao if the
Portuguese were to keep Macao for decades after 1997.63
The PRC, on the other hand, had two main rationales for wanting
to recover sovereignty over Macao and Hong Kong at the same time in
1997. First, Beijing did not want to regain Macao before 1997 for fear of
jeopardizing the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong. Secondly, Bei-
jing was anxious to settle the Hong Kong and Macao issues simultane-
ously in order to set the stage for its main objective-reunification of
Taiwan with mainland China." Beijing wanted to use the Hong Kong
and Macao models under the principle of "one country, two systems" as
good examples for incorporation of Taiwan into the PRC.65
The first three rounds of negotiations between Lisbon and Beijing
were deadlocked over the question of the date for transfer of Macao.
Eleven days before the third round of talks, Dr. Joaquim Pinto Machado,
Governor of Macao, stated in a radio broadcast that "it is completely
impossible to coincide the date when Macao will return to China with
the one chosen for Hong Kong. ... Macao does not have the dimension
and development of Hong Kong .... It will be a problem much more
complex."66
The Portuguese continued to be well aware that Lisbon's best card
in the talks was the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong, which the
PRC risked jeopardizing if Portugal pulled out of Macao prematurely.
Macao officials had threatened to use the unilateral pullout card twice.
In August 1985, Governor Vasco de Almeida e Costa asserted that the
PRC had spoken too much about taking back Macao at the same time as
Hong Kong in 1997. "Must we go to the negotiating table to take the
Chinese orders because China is such a powerful country?" asked Costa.
"Maybe we cannot wait for 12 years. We can leave within one or two
years," Costa warned. After the second round of talks in September
1986, Secretary for Economics, Finance and Tourism Carlos Monjardino
63 Reaves, China Sets its Sights on Taking Taiwan, Chicago Tribune, Mar. 31, 1987, at 6.
64 Id.
65 See Beifing Sets the Stage for the Main Event, S. China Morning Post, Mar. 27, 1987, at 22.
66 Governor Says 1997 Return to PRC 'Impossible' (Hong Kong AFP, Oct. 10, 1986), reprinted
in F.B.I.S., Oct. 10, 1986, at W4.
67 Lau, A Portuguese Farewell, FAR E. ECON. REv., Aug. 22, 1985, at 16. See also Macau '87,
supra note 11, at 182.
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made the same threat: "We will withdraw [from Macau] early if we are
not happy about the way things go. We have nothing to lose and we
don't want to lose face."6 8 The Portuguese view was that the problems of
returning Macao to the PRC were "completely different" from that of
Hong Kong and therefore the issues should be kept separate.69
Zhou Nan, the PRC's Vice-Foreign Minister and chief of its negoti-
ation team, visited Lisbon on November 17-22, 1986. Portugal insisted
that Zhou make this visit in order for its highest authorities to convey
Portugal's message to the PRC on the question of the transfer date as
well as the nationality issue.70 No agreement was reached, however, dur-
ing Zhou's visit. Beijing realized, nevertheless, Lisbon's sensitivity to-
ward these two issues. A compromise solution was offered by the PRC
at the end of November 1986.71 Ma Man Kee, chairman of Macao's
General Chamber of Commerce and a local representative of the Na-
tional People's Congress (NPC) 72 of the PRC, stated on November 30,
1986 that the handover of Macao "will not be later than the year 2000,
probably between 1997... and the end of the century. ' 73 On December
9, 1986 Ma again indicated that the PRC was determined to reach its
reunification objectives concerning Hong Kong and Macao by the end of
the century.74
The Portuguese were not ready, however, to accept Beijing's timeta-
ble. Antonio Barreto, a socialist deputy in the Portuguese Parliament
and a close advisor to President Mario Soares, said in a December 29,
1986 interview that a unilateral declaration of 2007 or 2017 as the date of
return was possible.75 His remarks, broadcast by Macao's radio and tele-
vision stations, drew strong reaction from the PRC. On December 31,
1986 the PRC Foreign Ministry said that "it is the unshakable and firm
stand and the firm desire of the Chinese government and the 1 billion
Chinese people, including our compatriots in Macao, to recover Macao
68 Macau '87, supra note 11, at 182.
69 Id.
70 Macao, PRC Dispute Status of Ethnic Chinese, Sunday Standard, Nov. 30, 1986, at 1, re-
printed in F.B.I.S., Dec. 4, 1986, at W8.
71 Macao-PRC Draft Agreement Expected by February (Hong Kong AFP, Nov. 30, 1986), re-
printed in F.B.I.S., Dec. 4, 1986, at W7.
72 The National People's Congress is the "highest organ of state under the leadership of the
[Chinese Communist Party] CCP and the only organ exercising the legislative power of the state."
COMPREHENSIVE GLOSSARY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST TERMINOLOGY 83 (Kuo ed. 1978).
73 Macao-PRC Draft Agreement Expected by February, supra note 71, at W7.
74 Macao Businessmen on Sino-Portuguese Talks, Zhongguo Tongxun She, Dec. 9, 1986, re-
printed in F.B.I.S., Dec. 10, 1986, at Wi.
75 PRC, Portugal Disagree on Date For Macao's Return, supra note 52, at W1; Borralho, Beiing
Reacts to Barreto's Remarks on Transfers, Hong Kong Standard, Jan. 1, 1987, at 1, reprinted in
F.B.I.S, Jan. 6, 1987, at W1.
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before the year 2000. "76 The PRC stated that any proposal to return
Macao subsequent to that year cannot be accepted."
Portugal finally was convinced that Beijing would not make any fur-
ther concession on the transfer date question. In early January 1987,
Portugal's State Council, an advisory body, met for four hours to discuss
the future of Macao. 8 President Soares and Prime Minister Cacaco
Silva presented full reports on negotiations with the PRC. It was re-
ported on January 7, 1987 that Portuguese authorities concluded that the
transfer of Macao by the year 2000 was unavoidable, but the exact date
was not selected. 9
Once Portugal decided to return Macao prior to 2000, negotiations
between Beijing and Lisbon again gained momentum. During the fourth
round of talks in March 1987, both sides agreed that December 20, 1999
would be the date to transfer Macao to the PRC. It was reported that
initially both sides selected December 31, 1999 as the transfer date. But
later the PRC was afraid that should anything go wrong on December
31, a holiday, the PRC would not realize its goal of settling both the
Hong Kong and Macao issues before the end of the century. So, an ear-
lier date, December 20, 1999, was chosen instead.8 0
C. Negotiation on the Nationality Issue
The second difficult issue during the Macao negotiations was the
nationality question. Portugal allows dual nationality making any holder
of a Portuguese passport a national. 1 According to the PRC Nationality
Law, however, no Chinese nationals are permitted to hold dual national-
ity.82 There are approximately 100,000 ethnic Chinese in Macao holding
Portuguese passports-about one-fifth of Macao's population.83 More-
over, unlike the United Kingdom, Portugal has only one type of nation-
ality which grants the right of entry and abode in Portugal and also
provides consular services and protection. In 1981, the United Kingdom
76 Borralho, supra note 75, at W1.
77 Id.
78 Administration To Revert To PRC Before 2000 (Hong Kong AFP, Jan. 7, 1987), reprinted in
F.B.I.S., Jan. 7, 1987, at W1.
79 PRC Threat 'to Annex' Macao (Hong Kong AFP, Jan. 9, 1987), reprinted in F.B.I.S., Jan.
12, 1987, at W2.
80 Ming Pao, Mar. 24, 1987, at 2.
81 Lin, Nationality Issue Troubles Macanese Portuguese, Pai Shing, July 16, 1985, at 51 (citing
the 1981 new Nationality Law of Portugal (art. 27) which allows dual or multi nationalities).
82 Nationality Law of the People's Republic of China, arts. 3,8, reprinted in COMPILATION OF
LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 1979-1984 at 200-01 (1985).
83 Administration to Revert to PRC Before 2000, supra note 78, at W1; see also Misquitta, supra
note 61, at 149; Portugal Seeks Concessions in Macao Talks (Hong Kong AFP, Mar. 19, 1987),
reprinted in F.B.I.S., Mar. 19, 1987, at W4.
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passed the British Nationality Act 4 which does not allow Hong Kong
residents to have the right of entry and abode in the United Kingdom."
In 1984, London and Beijing reached an agreement on the question of
nationality which was publicly announced in a U.K. Memorandum. The
Memorandum declared that Hong Kong residents holding British pass-
ports do not have the right of entry and abode in the United Kingdom,
but they do have the right to receive British consular services and protec-
tion in third countries.8 6
Likewise, the PRC stated in the Chinese Memorandum that "all
Hong Kong Chinese compatriots, whether they are holders of the 'Brit-
ish Dependent Territories Citizens' Passport' or not, are Chinese nation-
als.""7 The PRC will, however, "permit Chinese nationals in Hong
Kong who were previously called 'British Dependent Territories citizens'
to use travel documents ... for the purpose of travelling to other states
and regions."' 8  But they will not be entitled to British consular protec-
tion in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and other parts of
84 British Nationality Act, 1981, ch. 61, reprinted in 31 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND
113-79 (4th ed. 1987).
85 Id. See also Hong Kong, ASIA 1982 YEARBOOK 147 (1982); Hong Kong, ASIA 1983 YEAR-
BOOK 146 (1983) (On July 22, 1981, the House of Lords passed an amendment to the British Nation-
ality Bill, giving 27,000 people of Gibraltar the right to British citizenship, while denying the right to
the more than 5 million people of Hong Kong. The bill created three categories of citizenship, two
of which--citizens of British Dependent Territories and citizens of British Overseas-exclude the
right of entry and abode in Britain.).
86 Hong Kong Joint Declaration, supra note 3, at (A) United Kingdom Memorandum. The
U.K. Memorandum provides:
(a) All persons who on June 30, 1997, are, by virtue of a connection with Hong
Kong, British Dependent Territories citizens (BDTCs) under the law in force in the United
Kingdom will cease to be BDTCs with effect from 1 July 1997, but will be eligible to retain
an appropriate status which, without conferring the right of abode in the United Kingdom,
will entitle them to continue to use passports issued by the Government of the United
Kingdom. This status will be acquired by such persons only if they hold or are included in
such a British passport issued before 1 July 1997, except that eligible persons born on or
after I January 1997 but before 1 July 1997 may obtain or be included in such a passport
up to 31 December 1997.
(b) No person will acquire BDTC status on or after 1 July 1997 by virtue of a con-
nection with Hong Kong. No person born on or after I July 1997 will acquire the status
referred to as being appropriate in sub-paragraph (a).
(c) United Kingdom consular officials in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Re-
gion and elsewhere may renew and replace passports of persons mentioned in sub-para-
graph (a) and may also issue them to persons, born before I July 1997 of such persons, who
had previously been included in the passport of their parent.
(d) Those who have obtained or been included in passports issued by the Govern-
ment of the United Kingdom under sub-paragraphs (a) and (c) will be entitled to receive,
upon request, British consular services and protection when in third countries.
Id.
87 Id. at (B) Chinese Memorandum.
88 Id.
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the PRC. 9
Because the United Kingdom will not allow Hong Kong residents
who hold British passports to continue to have the right of entry and
abode after 1997, there is no dual nationality problem. The PRC has
shown great flexibility in allowing the use of travel documents outside of
Hong Kong and the PRC. As a result, no major confrontation has taken
place between London and Beijing on the question of nationality.
The Macao situation, however, was different in that Portugal was
not willing to make the sort of arrangement the British did in its 1981
Nationality Act, nor was Portugal prepared to create another type of
nationality to solve the problems in Macao. 90 Politically, it would have
hurt the Portuguese government to change the status of nationals hold-
ing Portuguese passports. Portugal has had a policy of accepting refu-
gees from former colonies as nationals, and these nationals would
become suspicious if the status of passport holders with similar colonial
backgrounds were to lose some of their rights.9 1 Additionally, Portu-
guese negotiators were not able to make such a concession even if they
had so wished since parliamentary approval is required to change the
nationality laws.92 That approval was not likely to be forthcoming, as
the government feared instability would be created by any changes in
their nationality laws. This was one of the reasons why the Portuguese
invited Zhou Nan to Lisbon in November 1986. 91 According to reliable
sources from Portugal, President Soares and Prime Minister Silva
wanted to explain the domestic difficulties to the PRC chief negotiator in
person.94
One of the Portuguese objectives during the negotiations was to pre-
serve Portugal's national dignity.95 By allowing its citizens and their de-
scendants the right of abode in Portugal and consular protection as any
other Portuguese nationals, Lisbon's international image would thus be
strengthened.96 Portugal is not prepared, however, to accommodate a
possible flood of refugees into Portugal from Macao. 97 It was important,
therefore, for the Portuguese to reach an agreement with the PRC to
89 Id.
90 Macao, PRC Dispute Status of Ethnic Chinese, supra note 70, at W8.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Macao Residents' Concerns (Lisbon Domestic Service, Mar. 20, 1987), reprinted in F.B.I.S.,
Mar. 23, 1987, at W4.
96 Lin, Macao Has Problems Which Remain to be Resolved, PA! SHING, Mar. 16, 1987, at 38.
97 Portuguese President's Press Interview, supra note 41, at 7 (on May 23, 1985, President Eanes
stated in an interview in Beijing that the "Portuguese government does not foresee a large scale of
immigrants (from Macao to Portugal). At the beginning of the changing of administration, of
course, this may be a problem, but I do not believe there will be many Macao-born Chinese who are
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maintain the status quo in Macao, while preserving the rights of Portu-
guese citizens in Macao.
After Portugal made the concession in January 1987 to return Ma-
cao before the year 2000, the nationality problem became the only re-
maining issue requiring extensive negotiation between Beijing and
Lisbon. The fourth round of talks between Lisbon and Beijing began
March 18, 1987. Portugal reiterated its position with respect to dual na-
tionality during the talks.98 The PRC, on the other hand, demanded one
citizenship-Chinese-for the inhabitants of Macao. 99 It was reported
that at one point Portuguese negotiators threatened to walk out unless an
agreement to their satisfaction was reached."° A compromise solution
was finally worked out on March 23, 1987.101
Because of the radically different positions held by Lisbon and Bei-
jing on the question of nationality, two separate memoranda were issued,
as in the Sino-British accord. The PRC side declared:
The inhabitants in Macao who come under the provisions of the
Nationality Law of the People's Republic of China, whether they are
holders of the Portuguese travel or identity documents or not, have
Chinese citizenship. Taking account of the historical background of
Macao and its realities, the competent authorities of the Government
of the People's Republic of China will permit Chinese nationals in Ma-
cao previously holding Portuguese travel documents to continue to use
these documents for travelling to other states and regions after the es-
tablishment of the Macao Special Administrative Region. The above-
mentioned Chinese nationals will not be entitled to Portuguese consu-
lar protection in the Macao Special Administrative Region and other
parts of the People's Republic of China. 102
Portugal declared its position in its Memorandum on the question of
nationality and passports, as follows: "In conformity with the Portu-
guese legislation, the inhabitants in Macao who, having Portuguese citi-
zenship, are holders of a Portuguese passport on December 19, 1999 may
continue to use it after this date. No person may acquire Portuguese
citizenship as from December 20, 1999 by virtue of his or her connection
with Macao."' 3
willing to immigrate to Portugal."). See also Administration to Revert to PRC Before 2000, supra
note 78, at W1.
98 Portugal Seeks Concessions in Macao Talks (Hong Kong AFP, Mar. 19, 1987), reprinted in
F.B.I.S., Mar. 19, 1987, at W4.
99 Id.
100 Center Daily News, Mar. 23, 1987, at 1.
101 Press Communique, supra note 54, at W2; Macao Agreement to be Commended, supra note
13, at W3.
102 Macao Joint Declaration, supra note 8, Exchange of Memoranda, Chinese Memoranda.
103 Id. Portuguese Memoranda.
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Although the PRC will only recognize Chinese passports after Ma-
cao returns to the PRC on December 20, 1999, Beijing will not strip
Macao residents of their Chinese nationality if they are holding Portu-
guese passports.104 Portugal gained more concessions on the nationality
issue than the British had gained. A primary reason for these conces-
sions was that Beijing was more anxious than Lisbon to reach an agree-
ment on Macao. Studies have shown that subjects facing a high degree of
pressure to reach agreement have had a higher concession rate and have
reached agreement more often than those subjects facing a low degree of
pressure to reach agreement.10 5 Beijing was under pressure to conclude
the Macao agreement for the following reasons.
1. Domestic Instability in the PRC
In January 1987, General Secretary Hu Yaobang resigned from his
post following a series of student demonstrations for greater political
freedom. Hu's forced resignation marked renewed party infighting be-
tween conservatives and moderate reformers. Premier Zhao Ziyang be-
came acting party leader in January 1987.106
PRC leaders had hoped to conclude the Macao settlement within a
short period of time since this would indicate that their policies worked
and that they could provide strong leadership. A few days before the
first round of talks, Zhou Nan optimistically announced his belief that
resolution of the Macao issue would be accomplished with more speed
and cooperation than the Sino-British negotiations on the Hong Kong
issue.'0 7 In November 1986, Beijing was hoping to reach an agreement
with Lisbon before January 1, 1987, or at the latest in February 1987 to
coincide with the celebration of the 8th anniversary of Sino-Portuguese
normalization of relations.1 08
If an agreement was reached, according to the PRC Constitution, it
would have to be endorsed by the NPC,1°9 which was scheduled to hold
its fifth session in March 1987. The PRC leaders apparently were anx-
ious to submit the Macao accord at this meeting, because a joint declara-
tion based on the "one country, two systems" principle would have
greatly strengthened Deng Xiaoping's leadership position. It is clear that
104 Macao Agreement to be Commended, supra note 13, at W3.
105 Hamner, Effects of Bargaining Strategy and Pressure to Reach Agreement in a Stalemated
Negotiation, 30 J. OF PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 464 (1974).
106 Southerland, Chinese Leaders Gather to Map National Strategy, Wash. Post, Aug. 8, 1987,
at A24.
107 Qi, Sino-Portuguese Talks in Prospect, Zhongguo Tongxun She, June 25, 1986, reprinted in
F.B.I.S., June 26, 1986, at W5.
108 Lin, Are Sino-Portuguese Negotiations on the Macao Issue Mutually Willing?, PAl SHING,
Apr. 1, 1987, at 13.
109 XIANFA (Constitution) art. 62 (People's Republic of China).
19881
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
the Portuguese understood very well the domestic political struggle in
the PRC. "Zhao Ziyang needs an agreement and we are using that to get
last-minute concessions," informed Portuguese sources said. 110 Zhao
Ziyang sought to use a joint declaration as proof to the NPC that the
PRC's open-door policy was successful and Portugal took advantage of
that fact. 11
2. Domestic Instability in Portugal
Besides their own domestic political considerations, PRC leaders
also considered the potentially unstable domestic politics in Portugal
when they made decisions on the Macao issue. One source of instability
is the diffusion of power between the prime minister and the president.
According to the 1976 Portuguese Constitution, it is the prime minister
and cabinet that conducts internal and external affairs, except in cases
where constitutionally the parliament must intervene. The president has
no executive powers.1 2 Practice has been otherwise, however, and this
heightens the instability." 3
A second source of instability is illustrated by the fact that during
the last fourteen years, there have been sixteen changes in government."I4
One government lasted only sixteen days. 15 There are four major par-
ties in Portugal, plus a number of smaller parties.1 16 The structure of the
electoral system makes it difficult to obtain an absolute majority." 7 No
party had managed to gain a clear electoral majority before July 1987.118
Consequently, no prime minister was able to function with any solid par-
liamentary support. Portugal has been governed by coalition or minority
governments for many years with a turnover in government every eleven
months on the average.' '9 This turnover in leadership placed pressure on
the PRC to quickly conclude any negotiations with Portugal before a
new government stepped in and the process had to begin over again.
It was no surprise, then, that Zhou Nan raised the Macao issue with
newly elected President Mario Soares during his visit to Lisbon in March
1986. It was not until the end of June, however, that negotiations began.
110 Portugal Seeks Concessions in Macao Talks, supra note 98, at W4.
III Id.
112 Balsemao, The Constitution and Politics, in PORTUGAL IN THE 1980's 204 (K. Maxwell ed.
1986).
113 Id.
114 Wise, New Premier Vows 'Great Struggle' in Portugal, Wash. Post, Aug. 18, 1987, at A9.
115 Macau '84, supra note 42, at 232.
116 Maxwell, At the Crossroads, in PORTUGAL IN THE 1980's, supra note 112, at 6. The four
major parties in Portugal are the Socialist Party, the Social Democratic Party, the Communist Party
and the Social Democratic Center Party.
117 Balsemao, supra note 112, at 203.
118 Wise, supra note 114, at A9.
119 Balsemao, supra note 112, at 203, 228.
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Throughout the talks, the PRC had been anxious to bring a quick end to
the Macao question. Portugal, on the other hand, saw no reason to rush
an agreement. 120 Because of domestic constraints, Portugal would have
preferred no agreement to a bad agreement. For the same reason, Beijing
would have preferred to conclude the Macao negotiation as soon as pos-
sible for fear that further delay might cause complications occasioned by
the Portuguese political instability.12' Under these circumstances, Lis-
bon gained more bargaining leverage vis-A-vis Beijing.
Beijing's concern was not ill-founded. Prime Minister Silva's gov-
ernment fell on April 3, 1987 when Parliament passed a vote of no confi-
dence against his government by a slim margin. Accordingly, when Silva
went to the PRC to sign the Joint Declaration, he was a "lame duck"
prime minister. Silva was, nevertheless, very well treated by the PRC
leaders during his stay. Beijing had hoped the Portuguese Parliament
could approve the Sino-Portuguese agreement on Macao before it ad-
journed on June 15, 1987, but this turned out to be wishful thinking. On
April 11, 1987, the Fifth Session of the Sixth NPC delegated the author-
ity to review and approve the Joint Declaration on Macao to the NPC
Standing Committee. 22 The standing committee ended its 21st meeting
on June 23, 1987 by approving the Joint Declaration.
Meanwhile, in Portugal Anibal Cavaco Silva's Social Democratic
Party won a landslide electoral victory on July 19, 1987 by winning 50%
of the vote and 148 of the 250 seats in the National assembly-Portugal's
first majority government with the greatest assurance of completing a
four-year term since 1974.123 The Joint Declaration was ratified by the
Parliament on December 11, 1987.124
IV. BEIJING'S NEGOTIATING TACTICS
The conventional perception of the process of negotiating is rather
simplistic: the parties involved sit at a bargaining table and exchange
promises, commitments, bluffs, threats, warnings, rewards, proposals,
and counterproposals through which they will either resolve their differ-
ences and reach an agreement or abort the negotiations. 12 5 The negotiat-
ing process in reality, however, is much more complex. Formal
bargaining at the negotiating table is only a part of the process. Propa-
120 Long, Will the Macao Question Soon Be Settled?, THE NINETIES, Jan. 1984, at 39.
121 Lin, Zhou Nan's Trip to Portugal Did Not Bring Expected Effects, PAl SHING, Dec. 16,
1986, at 36.
122 People's Daily, Apr. 12, 1987, at 1.
123 Wise, supra note 114, at A9.
124 Lin, Portuguese Parliament Approved the Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration, PAI SHING,
Jan. 1, 1988, at 38.
125 Colosi, A Model for Negotiation and Mediation, in INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION 16 (D.
Bendahmane & J. McDonald, Jr. eds. 1984).
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ganda, maneuvers of public opinion, mass media, informal exchanges of
ideas, for example, are also important parts of the negotiating process.
During the Macao negotiations, Beijing has used the following tac-
tics to strengthen its bargaining leverage vis-A-vis Lisbon.
A. Pre-Negotiation Maneuvers
How to set the stage and the rules of the game for formal negotia-
tions is, perhaps, as important as negotiating itself. Before the formal
negotiations began on the Macao issue in June 1986, the PRC had re-
peatedly stated its "non-negotiable" demands with respect to the transfer
date (first in 1997, then, before 2000) and the nationality issue in order to
persuade the Portuguese of the firmness of the Chinese "bottom line."
1. Nonnegotiable Demands
Postulation of nonnegotiable demands as a negotiating tactic has
been used very frequently by the PRC. 2 6 In order to establish an agenda
favorable to its objectives, the PRC would seek to establish its "nonnego-
tiable conditions" at the outset of a negotiation through leaks, formal
statements by officials, or by less formal channels. On the Hong Kong
question, PRC officials have successfully used the tactic of pre-negotia-
tion disclosure of the PRC's nonnegotiable demands in order to gain
favorable negotiating leverage with the British.
British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher visited the PRC on Sep-
tember 22-25, 1982. Before Premier Zhao Ziyang's scheduled meeting
with Mrs. Thatcher, he disclosed the PRC position to reporters, as fol-
lows: "Of course China will recover sovereignty over Hong Kong. But I
think the question of sovereignty will not influence Hong Kong's pros-
perity and stability." '27 The public disclosure of what would later be
offered in private was meant to convey the steadfastness of the PRC's
position.1 28 Deng Xiaoping was reported to have told Mrs. Thatcher
that Chinese sovereignty over Hong Kong was not open for negotiation.
The Chinese would not accede to anything less than the removal of the
British flag and the British governor.' 29
Beijing used the same tactic on the Macao issue in 1986. Why does
the PRC use the tactic of postulating "non-negotiable" demands prior to
negotiation? Chester L. Karrass has made the following observation re-
garding nonnegotiable demands:
126 See, e.g., Solomon, Friendship and Obligation in Chinese Negotiating Styles, in NATIONAL
NEGOTIATING STYLES 4-8 (H. Binnendijk ed. 1987); L. PYE, CHINESE COMMERCIAL NEGOTIAT-
ING STYLE x-xi, 20-23, 72-73, 95 (1982).
127 F. CHING, supra note 12, at 11.
128 Id.
129 Id.
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Nonnegotiable demands are demands so extreme that compro-
mise appears virtually impossible. At stake are deep-rooted values
The strange thing about nonnegotiable demands is that they can
help a negotiator rally his own people at the same time that he diffuses
the opposition. By making extreme demands a negotiator can demon-
strate his conviction ....
Non-negotiable demands lower the expectations of an opponent.
They make him more willing to compromise somewhere rather than
risk so serious a confrontation of values.' 30
It is clear that establishing nonnegotiable demands is part of the
PRC's bargaining style. The United Kingdom finally yielded on the is-
sues of sovereignty and administrative rights of Hong Kong. Portugal
also gave in and agreed to return Macao to the PRC before the year
2000. The PRC, however, compromised with Portugal on the nationality
issue. Accordingly, Richard H. Solomon has commented: "when Chi-
nese officials want to reach a specific agreement they will set aside their
stress on principle and reach a concrete understanding that in fact may
have little relation to-or may even seem to contravene-the principles
they stressed early in the negotiation."' 1 3'
2. United Front Campaign
To the Chinese Communists, the so-called united front strategy
"means forming an alliance with all the forces that can be 'united,' or-
ganizing them into a camp of 'uniformity,' and then employing all possi-
ble means of struggle against the enemy."' 132 Beijing has taken the
following measures to drive a wedge through the opposition:
a. Enlarging Macao's Representatives in the PRC
In February 1983, during the Hong Kong negotiations, Beijing en-
larged the representation of Hong Kong and Macao residents by 140
members in its legislative organ, the NPC, and its corollary, the Chinese
People's Political Consultative Conference (which while providing con-
sultative services, carries no real power). 33 In addition, the PRC also
enlarged the number of seats for Macao "compatriots" in the
Guangdong Provincial People's Congress by adding five appointees and
also in the Guangdong Political Consultative Conference where four
seats were added. These new members differed from their established
130 C. KARRASS, GIVE AND TAKE 127 (1984).
131 Solomon, supra note 126, at 4.
132 Wu, Can the Hong Kong Settlement Serve As A Model For Taiwan?, in THE FUTURE OF
HONG KONG, supra note 10, at 157.
133 F. CHING, supra note 12, at 13.
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counterparts. They were younger (aged 30-50) and came from a wider
cross-section of the pro-PRC Macao community, including heads of
sporting associations, trade unions, as well as school principals. 13' They
were not public figures, but Beijing resorted to its united front strategy of
isolating the primary antagonists by uniting them with as many other
people as possible. 135
The PRC also received delegations of all types from Macao and sent
representatives to visit Macao. Guangdong Governor Liang Lingguang
visited Macao in August 1983. In July 1983 and February 1987, Xu
Jiatun, director of the Xinhua news agency in Hong Kong as well as
China's unofficial ambassador in Hong Kong, visited Macao. During his
stay, Xu met representatives from the Chinese community, praised them
for their support of "reunification and modernization of the Mother-
land," and called for even greater cooperation in achieving these two
goals. 136 Xu articulated nationalist and patriotic values in an attempt to
unite Macao's people. He also promised Macao's prosperity and stability
would continue under the principle of "one country, two systems."1 37
b. Publicizing the "One Country, Two Systems" Slogan
The PRC has launched an extensive propaganda campaign consist-
ing of the "scientific" and "strategic" nature of the "one country, two
systems" principle. 138 The campaign was proclaimed as reflecting the
"patriotic united front during the new historical period." 139 A May 26,
1986 Beijing Review article promised that the Chinese government "will
give full consideration to Macao's history and present situation," and
that the Macao issue "will be solved to the satisfaction of all parties con-
cerned" according to the concept of "one country, two systems." 14
c. Wooing Public Opinion
Besides receiving all kinds of delegations from Macao and sending
various delegations to Macao, Beijing had also mounted a visible effort to
build confidence among Macao's residents. China's official representa-
tive in Macao, Nam Kwong Company, collected public opinion by tele-
134 Macau '84, supra note 42, at 208.
135 Id.
136 Lin, Xu Jiatun's New Year Visiting to Macao, PAl SHING, Feb. 16, 1987, at 49-51.
137 Id. at 50.
138 For details of.this principle, see Hsu, The Formulation and Significance of the Thought of
'One Country, Two Systems, TRI1UNE OF POL. SC. AND L., Aug. 1985, at 63-64; Lin, The Macao
Question is Satisfactorily Settled, OUTLOOK WEEKLY, Mar. 30, 1987, at 3; Deng, More on 'One
Country, Two Systems, BEUING REv., Apr. 6, 1987, at 21-22. Wu, supra note 132, at 157.
139 Wu, supra note 132, at 157.
140 Huan, supra note 18, at 22.
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phone shortly before the talks were to begin."' Some may wonder
whether this sampling was truly indicative of public opinion, as the local
residents may not have freely expressed their reservations to a commu-
nist organization. The majority of Macao residents were politically apa-
thetic, mainly because they felt powerless.
142
B. Tactics Used During Negotiations
1. Beijing as the Negotiating Location
Richard Solomon has pointed out that: "The Chinese prefer to ne-
gotiate on their own territory for being at home aids internal communi-
cations, decision-making and their orchestration of the ambiance of
negotiations from banquet toasts to the manipulation of the press." 43
On the Hong Kong and Macao issues, the PRC selected Beijing as the
negotiating location for several purposes. The PRC thought of Hong
Kong and Macao as Chinese territory; therefore, negotiations should be
on China's soil.1" The United Kingdom had no objection-all twenty-
two rounds of talks between the PRC and Britain took place in Beijing.
Portugal, however, did not want to repeat what it considered the
humiliating experience of Britain. Portugal wanted to rotate the negoti-
ating locations between Beijing and Lisbon on each occasion.14 The
PRC disagreed. A compromise was reached, however, in that Zhou Nan
would visit Lisbon in return for Portugal's agreement to negotiate the
Macao settlement in Beijing. 146 The PRC declared, however, the pur-
pose of Zhou's visit was not for talks on the Macao issue, but for "a
good-will visit."147
Besides the historic reasons, PRC leaders also wanted to impress
Portuguese negotiators with the greatness of Chinese culture, by includ-
ing banquet cuisine and sightseeing trips. Solomon believes that these
aspects of the negotiating process are often used by the PRC in order to
create a sense of China's "great tradition and future potential-and in
partial compensation for its current political and economic weakness." '148
141 Macau '87, supra note 11, at 183.
142 Shing Dao Daily, June 30, 1986, at 7.
143 Davis, How Britain Fell for the Peking Game-Plan, FAR E. ECON. REV., June 21, 1984, at
44.
144 Lin, Practical Contradictions Between China and PortugalAre Ambiguous, PAl SHING, July
16, 1986, at 42.
145 Portuguese President's Press Interview, supra note 41, at 9.
146 Lin, supra note 121, at 35.
147 PRC Vice Foreign Minister on Macao Issue (Xinhua, Nov. 23, 1986), reprinted in F.B.I.S.,
Dec. 1, 1986, at W4.
148 Solomon, supra note 126, at 13. See also Shiung, Will Sino-Portuguese Talks Be Peaceful?,
THE MIRROR, 1987, at 21 (citing that during the Macao negotiations, Portuguese negotiators were
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2. Time Pressure: Deadline
A major negotiating tactic often used by the PRC is the effort to use
time pressures against an adversary.149 Beijing has successfully applied
time pressures and deadlines against the United Kingdom on the Hong
Kong issue. On the Macao issue, however, it was the PRC-not Portu-
gal-that was vulnerable to time pressures.
Beijing takes advantage of an adversary's anxiety to conclude a
given deal.15 A deadline is, actually, one of the most frequently used
tactics in negotiation. As one commentator states: deadlines "force ac-
tion" and "pressure people into making an either-or choice."15
There are several advantages in manipulating deadlines. First, a
sense of urgency can be created.1 52 Second, deadlines can be used to
deny your opponent time to gather sufficient knowledge and insight for
making sound judgments. 53 Third, a deadline gives the impression that
you are ready to deal. 154 Deadlines, properly executed, are effective from
the lowest to the highest level of negotiation.155 According to Karrass,
"[e]xperience tells us that some deadlines mean dead, others not. Some
are costly, others inconsequential."' 56
One of the tactics Beijing used during Hong Kong negotiations was
to impose a deadline in order to persuade London to concede on the
sovereignty and administration issues. There were two stages of the
Hong Kong negotiations. The first stage of the negotiations took place in
1982-83 and was characterized by impasse or deadlock. 57 The PRC in-
sisted that Britain give up sovereignty and administrative rights on Hong
Kong. The United Kingdom, on the other hand, wanted to receive con-
tinuing British administration in exchange for acknowledging Beijing's
sovereignty over Hong Kong.
Throughout the first stage of the negotiations, Hong Kong's finan-
cial and economic conditions deteriorated and the Hong Kong dollar
steadily declined in value. This was an indication of the lack of public
morale brought about by the deadlock. The third round of talks took
place August 2-3, 1983 and there was still no progress, 158 and the fourth
invited by the PRC for sightseeing trips after each round of talks in Beijing. They had visited the
Chengde Summer Palace, Shandong and Yangtse River).
149 Solomon, supra note 126, at 13.
150 Id. at 16.
151 C. KARRASS, supra note 130, at 44-45.
152 D. LEWIS, POWER NEGOTIATING TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES 53 (1981).
153 Id.
154 Id. at 54.
155 Id. at 55.
156 C. KARRASS, supra note 130, at 45.
157 THE FUTURE OF HONG KONG, supra note 10, at 7.
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round was held on September 22-23, 1983. Meanwhile, the Hong Kong
stock market continued to drop, the index falling 65.58 points to
785.48.159 In late September 1983, Hong Kong's dollar also plummeted
in value against the American dollar-the greatest fall in its history. 160
In the middle of this financial crisis, the PRC disclosed its intention
to announce its own plans for the future of Hong Kong, if an agreement
with the United Kingdom could not be reached by September 1984.161
By unilaterally imposing a deadline, the PRC dramatized the likelihood
of a breakdown in negotiations and heightened the risk of further deterio-
ration of the Hong Kong economy. In addition, Deng Xiaoping was re-
ported to have said that the PRC would not give in regardless of how far
the Hong Kong dollar dropped. 162 Premier Zhao also said, "No country
can put prosperity ahead of sovereignty."16
Against this background the United Kingdom became convinced of
the firmness of Beijing's position. London finally decided to give in. The
White Paper on Hong Kong, published in September 1984 as the "Draft
Agreement", points out that "[tlhe alternative to acceptance of the pres-
ent agreement is to have no agreement. In this case the Chinese Govern-
ment has made it plain that negotiations could not be reopened and that
it would publish its own plan for Hongkong.""'
The deadline tactic used by the PRC was apparently very effective.
The British concession marked the most significant breakthrough in the
Hong Kong negotiations. The fifth round of talks ended on October 20,
1983, the phrases "useful and constructive" reappeared in the press com-
munique after the talks.161
In the Macao negotiation, Beijing was pressured to reach an agree-
ment with Portugal because of domestic consideration in both countries.
Portugal, on the other hand, had no pressure to meet any deadlines.
During the deadlock period over the transfer date issue, Zhou Nan
was reported to have threatened Portugal with annexation of Macao
should Lisbon not agree to return Macao prior to the year 2000. This
threat was reportedly made to Portuguese Foreign Minister Pedro Pires
de Miranda during Zhou Nan's visit to Lisbon in November 1986.166
The PRC, however, denied the report. "[T]here was never an ultimatum
or any threat of annexation," a Foreign Ministry spokesman said. 167
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160 Id.
161 Id. at 20.
162 Id. at 17.
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Regardless of whether this threat was made, it was the PRC which
was anxious to reach a quick agreement on the Macao question. Portu-
gal, because of domestic uncertainty, would have preferred no agreement
to a bad agreement on the Macao issue. Indeed, it was Lisbon which
made repeated threats to pull out of Macao prior to 1997. Beijing, there-
fore, was in a less advantageous position to bargain with Portugal. It is
no surprise that the PRC ultimately made a concession on the nationality
issue.
3. Making Concessions in the Eleventh Hour
The PRC leaders are masters of eleventh-hour negotiations, but if
the adversary persists and waits patiently and if Beijing needs an agree-
ment badly, the PRC will make final concessions in order to conclude an
arrangement.
There are several advantages in making concessions toward the end
of negotiations. First, it makes the receiving party more appreciative of
the concessions. 168 Second, one can test the other side's limits before
making important concessions.
Beijing tends to make concessions at the last minute of negotiations.
On the nationality issue, for example, the PRC did not acquiesce to Por-
tugal's "dual nationality" demand until the last day of negotiations. In
addition, Beijing tends to make concessions on less vital issues, while
demanding an adversary to yield on the most important issues according
to its "non-negotiable" principle.
C. Post-Negotiation Maneuvers
Many foreign negotiators comment that the PRC does not believe
that reaching an agreement means the end of negotiations. 169 The Chi-
nese may seek modifications of formal agreements or reopen issues if it
serves their interests.
170
On the Macao issue, it was not clear how Beijing would implement
the "dual nationality" provision. Macao residents holding Portuguese
passports are now free to live in Portugal. Portugal is now a member
state of the European Economic Community (EEC). As a consequence,
there are restrictions on free movement of Portuguese to other EEC
states, but these will be lifted in the 1990s. '' There are concerns, there-
fore, among the EEC countries that migrating Portuguese workers may
increase rapidly once they have free access to the EEC states. It was
168 C. KARRASS, supra note 130, at 39.
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reported that Britain, other EEC states and the PRC may pressure Por-
tugal to change its nationality law before 1999 to make it more difficult
for Chinese in Macao to acquire Portuguese citizenship.172
Negotiations of the Hong Kong Basic Law since the conclusion of
the Joint Declaration show that Beijing has "second thoughts" regarding
parts of the agreement reached in September 1984. For example, the
PRC declares in the Joint Declaration that the Hong Kong Special Ad-
ministrative Region "will enjoy a high degree of autonomy" and "will be
vested with executive, legislative and independent judicial power." '173
The PRC apparently now wants more authority for the executive branch
than for the legislative branch. 74 There are also disputes about the
meaning of the words "high degree of autonomy." Because of China's
willingness to ask for modifications, it is still too early to tell how Beijing
will implement the "one-country, two systems" principle with regard to
both Hong Kong and Macao.
V. CONCLUSION
It is apparent from the foregoing analysis that the Macao negotia-
tions and settlement were not woven by the PRC from the same cloth as
the Hong Kong agreement. Despite the fact that the PRC initially
sought settlement and return of both territories at the same time for the
same reasons, and that some similarities are evident in the terms of the
two agreements, we have seen that Macao was a "different kettle of fish"
from Hong Kong.
In comparison with what is already known about the Hong Kong
settlement, it is clear that significant dissimilarities existed between Hong
Kong and Macao. These distinct differences derived in part from local
conditions peculiar to Macao and from domestic political concerns and
developments within Portugal and the PRC, respectively.
This analysis of the Macao case suggests four important conclusions
about the PRC's negotiating style.
1) The PRC will be flexible and pragmatic in making those conces-
sions it feels necessary to accomplish its objectives, even if this requires
significant departure from precedent and previously stated positions.
2) The PRC will engage in various pre-negotiation tactics compris-
ing: postulation of so-called "non-negotiable demands," the leaking of
these, and the wooing of public opinion including utilization of various
"united front" campaigns.
3) The PRC will resort to various tactics during negotiation that
172 Lau, supra note 171, at 36-37; Lau & Bowring, supra note 171, at 14-16.
173 Hong Kong Joint Declaration, supra note 3, para. 3(2)-(3).
174 Cheung, The Outline of the Draft of the Basic Law is Appearing, PAI SHING, Dec. 16, 1987,
at 3-5.
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may include: insisting on Beijing as the negotiating location; using time
pressure or deadline tactics; and deferring any concessions to the last
moment.
4) The PRC will also use a variety of post-negotiation maneuvers,
such as seeking modifications or reopening negotiations on any issue that
serve its interests. (Table 2)
Table 2.
Negotiation Beijing's Negotiating Tactics
Phases on the Macao Issue
(1) Pre-negotiation Maneuvers (a) Non-negotiable Demands
(b) United Front Campaign
(2) Tactics Used During (a) Beijing as the Negotiating
Negotiation Location
(b) Time Pressure: Deadline
(c) Making Concessions in the
Eleventh Hour
(3) Post-negotiation Maneuvers (a) Modifications of Formal
Understanding
(b) Reopening Resolved Issues
Finally, more research is required, particularly of the Macao case,
before analysts can confidently make additional generalizations about the
PRC's negotiating style that may be of predictive value for the Taiwan
and other issues.
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